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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
The findings of fact of the trial court, not the decision o 
the Court of Appeals as asserted by the Respondent, should b 
viewed with a presumption of correcthess. Rule 52(a) of the Uta 
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the trial court's finding 
of fact should not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. 
POINT II| 
The trial courtfs finding of testamentary intent and refusa 
to find a lack of testamentary capacity should not be overturne 
because the evidence does not clearly preponderate against th 
trial court? s findings. The burden of proof regarding testamen 
tary intent and testamentary capacity is on the party challengin 
a will, and the personal representative failed to meet that burde 
of proof. 
The trial court refused to make a finding of fact regardin 
the decedent's alleged preparation of "formal" wills for famil 
members, and that refusal is not clear error. Even if the cour 
had made such a finding, the alleged preparation of "formal" will 
does not demonstrate a lack of testamentary intent to make 
holographic will because it does not relate to decedent's belief 
as to the requirements of a holographic will. The trial cour 
made no finding of fact based on the testimony of decedent' 
daughter that decedent would at later times prepare more forma 
documents from cards similar to the holographic document, and th 
failure to make such a finding is not clear error. Even if th 
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decedent did intend to make a formal will at a later date, the 
decedent could still possess testamentary intent regarding the 
holographic document, and the trial court's finding of testamen-
tary intent is not clearly against the preponderance of the 
evidence. 
The personal representative would have failed to meet its 
burden of proof regarding a lack of testamentary capacity even if 
the trial court had accepted all of the personal representative's 
evidence because that evidence at best only inferred that the 
decedent had been drinking when the holographic document was 
written. No evidence was presented that the decedent was drunk 
or intoxicated or that the decedent lacked any of the specific 
elements of testamentary capacity. 
POINT III 
The fact that the decedent did not dispose of all his property 
by the holographic documents does not invalidate the will. The 
Utah Uniform Probate Code authorizes the probate of more than one 
will and authorizes partial intestate dispositions, demonstrating 
a clear legislative intent to allow partial testamentary disposi-
tions. 
No evidence supports the personal representative's assertion 
that the cards to the will may have been prepared at separate 
times. Even if the cards were prepared at different dates, the 
cards would be valid as a holographic will because they meet the 
Utah holographic will requirements. Later additions to holograph-
ic wills should be allowed without the necessity of resigning the 
2 
will because the additions can adopt the prior signature. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Standard Of Review Of The Court Of Appealsf Decision Se 
Out By The Personal Representative Is Incorrect. 
This Court has held that on appeal, the evidence and judgmen 
of the trial court should be viewed in the light most favorabl 
to the prevailing party, that the judgment of the trial court b 
afforded a presumption of correctness, and that the trial cour 
be affirmed if supported by competent evidence. See, e.g., Swase 
v. Rocky Point Ditch Co., 660 P.2d 224 (Utah 1983) at 225-226 
The personal representative has cited two cases in his brief a 
supporting his position that the decision of the Court of Appeal 
should be presumed proper, and that its ruling should stand unles 
deemed arbitrary and capricious. Both of these cases were decide 
before the existence of the Utah Court of Appeals and actuall 
support a presumption in favor of the trial court. In Lith 
Sales, Inc. v. Cutrubus, 636 P.2d 487 (Utah 1981), the cour 
stated that it "indulges the findings and judgment of the tria 
court with a presumption of validity and correctness . . . ". Th 
case does not involve the review of an intermediate appellat 
court decision in any way. In Peatross v. Board of Commissioner 
of Salt Lake County, 555 P. 2d 281 (Utah 1976), the second cas 
cited by the personal representative, the court was reviewing th 
decision of a district court that the appellant was not entitle 
to a trial de novo from a decision of the Board of Commissioner 
of Salt Lake County. The court stated that the reviewing cour 
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(the district court) should not upset the actions of the lower 
tribunal (the Board of Commissioners) unless the tribunal exceeded 
its authority or acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The 
case does not support the position of the personal representative 
for at least two reasons. First, the arbitrary and capricious 
standard deals with the review of an administrative decision 
rather than a judicial decision. Second, even if the standard did 
apply, it is the trial court, not the Court of Appeals, that is 
most analogous to the Board of Commissioners' role of being the 
initial finder of fact; thus Peatross supports deference toward 
the trial court's findings, not the Court of Appeals. 
This Court can review the record from a position equal to that 
of the Court of Appeals, while the trial court was in the unique 
position of being able to view the witnesses, evaluate their 
credibility, and determine the proper weight to be given to the 
evidence. Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous and due 
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses." See also Sweeney Land 
Company v. Gilbert, 127 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Utah February 9, 1990). 
Thus, it is the trial court's findings of fact, including its 
findings that the decedent intended the document to be his will 
and that the handwritten name constitutes the decedent's signature 
(R. 122-125), not the Court of Appeals' reversal, that should be 
viewed with a presumption of correctness. 
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II. The Personal Representative Failed To Meet Its Burden 0 
Proof To Show A Lack Of Testamentary Intent Or Testamen 
tary Capacity. 
The personal representative's brief raises the issues c 
testamentary intent, and, indirectly, testamentary capacity, whic 
were not addressed by the Court of Appeals in its decision in thi 
case. Whether or not a decedent has testamentary intent ar 
testamentary capacity in writing and signing a holographic wil 
is a question of fact to be decided by the trial court. Unde 
Utah Code Ann. §75-3-407 (1978), the personal representative i 
this case has the burden of proof regarding testamentary inter 
and capacity. "Contestants of a will have the burden of es 
tablishing lack of testamentary intent or capacity . 
Parties have the ultimate burden of persuasion as to matters wit 
respect to which they have the initial burden of proof." Ic 
This Court has held on numerous occasions that it will reverse c 
the facts only when the evidence clearly preponderates against t\ 
findings of the trial court. See, e.g., Crimmins v. Simonds, 6^  
P.2d 478 (Utah 1981); Utah County v. Baxter, 635 P.2d 61 (Utc 
1981). It is the trial court's privilege to be the exclusi^ 
judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to t 
given to the evidence. DeVas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P.. 
290, 293 (1962), cert, denied 371 U.S. 821 (1962). The trie 
court is not required to find evidence is persuasive even whei 
the evidence is uncontradicted. Super Tire Market, Inc. ^  
Rollins, 18 Utah 2d 122, 417 P.2d 132 (1966). 
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A. Testamentary Intent, 
In the present case, the holographic document and the cir-
cumstances support the trial court's finding of testamentary 
intent. The document is titled "Last Will & Test" and provides, 
"I, Robert E. Erickson, do hereby state that I leave and bequeath 
to the following persons of my family and others . . . ." (3-P). 
The document then makes specific gifts of personal property to the 
decedent's wife and children and to Mr. Misaka. (3-P). The gifts 
to Mr. Misaka involve property in which Mr. Misaka and the 
decedent had joint business interests. (R. 75-81, R. 133-134). 
Thus, the language of the document and the surrounding circumstan-
ces show strong evidence of an intent by the decedent to make a 
testamentary gift. 
The personal representative presented evidence and has argued 
several grounds in its brief regarding a showing of lack of 
testamentary intent. None of those grounds, either by themselves 
or in combination, show error by the trial court in finding the 
existence of testamentary intent. 
1. Other Wills. 
The personal representative presented testimony from the 
decedent's daughter that the decedent had prepared wills for other 
members of his family (R. 153-154), and presented into -'idence 
wills (the "family wills") allegedly prepared by decedei The 
trial court made no finding of fact as to whether or i the 
decedent had prepared the family wills, and rejected the pei onal 
representative's proposed findings of fact which contained that 
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finding. (R. 115). The evidence before the trial court wc 
sufficiently unpersuasive to justify the trial court's refusal t 
find that decedent had prepared the family wills. The decedent' 
daughter had a direct financial interest in the case, and r 
foundation was given to show the basis of her assertions (R. 115' 
Further, nothing contained in the family wills shows that tt 
decedent prepared them (4-D). Given the failure of the persons 
representative to present any evidence other than decedent' 
daughter's bare allegations that the decedent prepared the fami] 
wills, it was within the trial court's discretion to determir 
that the evidence was not credible and would be given little c 
no weight. 
Even if the testator had prepared "formal" wills for oth<= 
persons, it would not be inconsistent with preparing a holograph! 
will for himself. The laws of Utah and most, if not all, of tY 
other states allow for holographic wills, and many states 
including Utah, allow such a will where it is not signed at th 
end* Given those laws, it is unreasonable to infer that 
testator did not intend to make a holographic will simply becaus 
he may have had knowledge of the requirements of non-holographi 
wills. 
The only legal authority cited by the personal representati\. 
on this proposition is In re Hughes1 Estate, 140 Cal. App. 97, 2 
P.2d 204 (1934), which is distinguishable on its facts. Hughe 
involved two purported holographic wills drafted by the decedent 
The earlier document was "drawn with much technical detail ar 
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care, " while the later document was in the form of a short letter 
which ended "My will is in my safe box in Oakland Bank." Ld. at 
205. The court stated that it was significant that both documents 
were hologrciphic wills because the technical detail and care shown 
in the first holographic will showed "a belief in the testator of 
the necessity of a formal document to effect a disposition of his 
estate." Id.. This was a factor, together with the reference in 
the second document to the location of decedent's will and 
extraneous circumstances, which the court used in determining that 
the testator did not intend for the second document to be a will. 
In the present case, the testator's alleged preparation of 
"formal" wills for other family members provides no evidence of 
the testator's belief as to the requirements of holographic wills, 
and therefore does not provide evidence supporting a lack of 
testamentary intent. 
2. Drafts. 
The personal representative presented testimony from the 
decedent's daughter that the decedent would prepare typewritten 
documents and letters from notes made on 3" x 5" cards. <9. 155-
156). The trial court's finding of testamentary intent in spite 
of that testimony is not clearly erroneous for at least two 
reasons. First, the trial court's refusal to make a finding of 
fact on this matter is not clearly erroneous because no foundation 
was given for the testimony of decedent's daughter, an interested 
party, and no direct evidence was presented regarding the 
testator's intent in the present case. Second, even if the trial 
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court had accepted the evidence presented, the evidence at bes-
only infers that the decedent may have intended to later prepare 
a typewritten will, and such an inference does not refute the 
testamentary intent of the holographic document in question. Ai 
intent to later prepare a more formal document does not preclude 
or detract from a finding of testamentary intent in regard to ai 
earlier document. In re Kuttler's Estate, 160 Cal. App.2d 322 
325 P.2d 624, 631 (1958); Richberg v. Robbins, 33 Tenn. App. 66 
228 S.W.2d 1019, 1022 (1950); and In re Estate of Teubert, 29! 
S.E.2d 456, 461 (W.Va. 1982). 
B. Testamentary Capacity. 
The personal representative presented testimony from dece-
dent's daughter that the decedent would prepare 3" x 5" cards 
after drinking, that decedent's handwriting would change aftei 
drinking, and that decedent's spelling would deteriorate aftei 
drinking. The trial court's failure to accept the evidence 
presented and the inference that decedent was drinking at the time 
of the execution of the holographic document was not clearly 
erroneous. The only evidence presented was the testimony oJ 
decedent's daughter, an interested party. No direct evidence was 
presented that decedent had been drinking at the time he wrote the 
holographic document. Further, even assuming decedent had beer 
drinking when he wrote the holographic document, no evidence was 
presented that decedent was intoxicated to the point of lackinc 
testamentary capacity. The decedent's daughter did not testify 
that the decedent was drunk or intoxicated and her testimony die 
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not address any of the standards related to testamentary capacity. 
Instead, all of the decedent's daughter's testimony related only 
to "drinking" by the decedent (R. 156-160). When specifically 
cross-examined by opposing counsel, the decedent's daughter was 
unable to testify that decedent was drunk or intoxicated: 
Q. Can you san that every time he wrote on 
those index cards and made little notes to 
himself that he was drunk? 
A. I can say there are times I saw him write 
on index cards he had been drinking. 
(R. 160, lines 13-17). 
The standard for testamentary capacity is that the testator 
must know the natural objects of his bounty, be able to recall 
his property, and have capacity to intelligently and voluntarily 
form a plan of disposition. In re Holten's Estate, 17 Utah 2d 
29, 404 P.2d 27, 29 (1965). Drinking by itself does not render 
a person incompetent to make a will; instead, the proper question 
is whether the person possessed the elements of testamentary 
capacity. See Paskvan v. Mesich, 455 P. 2d 229, 234 (Alaska 
1969), In re Kraft's Estate, 374 P.2d 413, 415-416 (Alaska 1962). 
The personal representative did not present evidence relating 
to decedent's lack of the specific requirements of testamentary 
capacity. Given the failure to present evidence other than 
decedent's daughter's testimony inferring that decedent might 
have been "drinking," the personal representative failed to meet 
its burden of proof as to the issue of testamentary capacity. 
The trial court's refusal to find a lack of testamentary capacity 
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should not be overturned because the evidence does not clearl 
preponderate against the trial court. 
III. The Form of the Holographic Documents Does Not Negat 
Its Validity. 
Point I.D of Mr. Misakafs (Petitioner's) brief addresse 
issues related to the form of the hdlographic document raised 1 
the Court of Appeals decision. The personal representative' 
brief raises further issues related to the form of the documen 
which are addressed below. 
A. Partial Disposition of Property. 
The personal representative asserts that the will should b 
invalid because it does not contain a residuary clause or make 
complete disposition of the decedent's property. Utah Code Ann 
§§75-3-410 and 411 (1978) recognize that a will need not dispos 
of the testator's entire estate, aqd provide the proper manne 
for the determination of the beneficiaries of the remaimn 
portion of the estate. Section 75-3-410 provides that more tha 
one will may be probated where neither will expressly revokes th 
other or contains provisions which work as a total revocation b 
implication. Section 75-3-411 provides, "If it becomes eviden 
in the course of a formal testacy proceeding that, though one o 
more instruments are entitled to be probated, the decedent' 
estate is or may be partially intestate, the court shall enter a 
order to that effect." These provisions clearly show that unde 
the Utah Uniform Probate Code a will is not invalid because I 
fails to dispose of all of the property of the testator, an< 
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demonstrates a legislative intent to allow partial testamentary 
dispositions, refuting the personal representative's argument 
that it is against public policy to distribute part of an estate 
under a will and the remainder by intestate succession. In the 
present case, Utah Code Ann. §75-3-410 (1978) allows the prior 
will of the decedent to remain in effect regarding the property 
not disposed of by the holographic will. The language of §75-3-
410 also refutes the personal representative's argument that a 
provision revoking prior wills is a formal requirement for making 
a will. 
B. Time Period When Document Was Prepared. 
The personal representative argues that "no one knows when 
the cards were prepared or even if they were prepared at the same 
time." The personal representative presented no evidence that 
the cards were prepared at different times, and presented no 
support for the legal proposition that the cards would be invalid 
as a will if they were prepared at different times. The expert 
witness presented by Mr. Misaka testified that the cards were 
written within as narrow a time frame as could be determined by 
forensic science. (R. 145-146). The expert witness did not 
testify that the cards were prepared four to six months apart, 
but instead stated that the field of forensic science is only 
exact enough to be able to determine from handwriting whether 
documents were written within a four to six month period. (R. 
145-146). Thus, the evidence clearly supports a finding that the 
cards were prepared at the same time. 
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Even assuming the cards were written at different dates, thi 
Court should find that as a matter of law the cards are valid a 
a holographic will. The holographic document is entirely ii 
decedent's handwriting and contains decedent's signature. Se< 
Point I of petitioner's brief. Given the Uniform Probate Code': 
stated intention of validating wills wherever possible, addition; 
to a will at a later time should not invalidate the will if i" 
otherwise meets the requirements of a holographic will. Sec 
General Comment to Part 5 of Article II, Official Comments to the 
Uniform Probate Code. Further, the case law of other states 
allows additions to be made to a holographic will at a later date 
without the necessity of resigning the will on the theory thai 
the old signature is adopted and the several writings are in-
tegrated into one document. See Randall v. Salvation Army, IOC 
Nev. 466, 686 P.2d 241 (1984); In re Dumas' Estate, 34 Cal. 2c 
406, 210 P.2d 697 (1949); Succession of Guiraud, 164 La. 610, 114 
So. 489, 490 (1927); LaRue v. Lee, 63 W.Va. 388, 60 S.E. 388, 39C 
(1908). 
Respectfully submitted this day of March, 1990. 
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN 
KEN P. JONES 
Attorneys rxir Petitioner, 
Tatsumi Misaka 
yOb*~ 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am a member of and/or employed in the 
law firm of Watkiss & Saperstein, 310 South Main Street, Suite 
1200, Salt Lake City, Utah, and that in said capacity four (4) 
true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF PETITION-
ER were caused to be hand-delivered to the person named below 
this 14th day of March, 1990: 
Randy S. Ludlow, Esq. 
Attorney for Respondent 
311 South State Street, Suite 280 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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